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Abstract
This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study investigates a crucial parameter in spatial description, namely
variants in the frame of reference chosen. Two frames of reference are available in European languages for the description
of small-scale assemblages, namely the intrinsic (or object-oriented) frame and the relative (or egocentric) frame. We
showed participants a sentence such as ‘‘the ball is in front of the man’’, ambiguous between the two frames, and then a
picture of a scene with a ball and a man – participants had to respond by indicating whether the picture did or did not
match the sentence. There were two blocks, in which we induced each frame of reference by feedback. Thus for the crucial
test items, participants saw exactly the same sentence and the same picture but now from one perspective, now the other.
Using this method, we were able to precisely pinpoint the pattern of neural activation associated with each linguistic
interpretation of the ambiguity, while holding the perceptual stimuli constant. Increased brain activity in bilateral
parahippocampal gyrus was associated with the intrinsic frame of reference whereas increased activity in the right superior
frontal gyrus and in the parietal lobe was observed for the relative frame of reference. The study is among the few to show a
distinctive pattern of neural activation for an abstract yet specific semantic parameter in language. It shows with special
clarity the nature of the neural substrate supporting each frame of spatial reference.
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Introduction
The aim of the study reported here is to shed light on the
cortical systems underlying the spatial frame of reference concepts
crucially involved in spatial language. Here we use linguistic
ambiguities of frames of reference to pinpoint the cortical
activations associated with each of two distinct frames of reference.
In doing so, we are able to localize the circuitry associated with an
abstract parameter of linguistic meaning.
Language constructs ambiguities – two takes on the same
linguistic string. For example, Visiting relatives can be boring could
mean ‘going to see relatives is boring’, or it could mean ‘relatives
who come and see us are boring’. In a similar way, The ball is in
front of the man could mean ‘the ball is at the man’s front’ (see
Figure 1, Panel A) or ‘the ball is between me and the man’. In
some spatial arrangements, both kinds of interpretation may be
equally valid (see e.g. Panel B, C1). In the latter case, how could
we tell which way an observer is thinking? We will suggest that
each perspective has a distinctive neural signature.
Ambiguities in language are similar to ambiguities elsewhere in
perception. For example, a wire-framed image like a Necker cube
can be perceived as if from two different locations, a high vantage
point or a low vantage point, requiring a reversal of the depth of
the implied ‘faces’. The reversal can be induced by rotating the
wire frame on a monitor [1], and the time-course and location of
activation associated with reversal measured by EEG and fMRI
respectively. Spontaneous reversals occur early on in stimulus
presentation and are associated with specific neural signatures [2].
It has also been suggested that there is a specific signature of
conscious awareness of multistable images [3].
Language is not vision, and there is no corresponding evidence
for spontaneous reversals. Nevertheless, the processing of ambi-
guities shows special neural activations, for example, when the less
frequent lexical meaning is contextually required [4]. Here we
focus not on the processing of the ambiguity itself, but rather on
the methodological trick ambiguities afford – namely the
possibility of using a sustained ambiguity to explore the activation
of a single point change in interpretation. Holding the objective
perceptual stimulus constant, we can explore the neural correlates
of a subjective change in meaning.
Why is this interesting? Because hitherto the neurocognition of
meaning has for the most part lacked the necessary degree of
precision with respect to different possible aspects of meaning.
Many studies have examined what areas are activated in a
semantic vs. a syntactic task [5], and have built on contrastive
electrophysiological signals of semantic vs. syntactic violations [6].
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30657But relatively few studies have been able to isolate very precise
aspects of meaning and their corresponding neurocognitive
signatures, with three kinds of exception. The first, following up
the lesion literature [7] concerns the possible category-specific
nature of the neurocognitive processing of words (see [8] for a
review of imaging studies). Categories such as tools vs. animals, as
explored through corresponding words, seem to show different
patterns of neural activation. However, the activation patterns
associated with such domains are never very precise, and may in
any case be due to non-linguistic downstream activation of, e.g.,
visual properties. A second line of work has explored more high-
level categories or domains, like the difference between spatial
relations as encoded in prepositions vs. object names [9–11],
finding greater activation of parietal and frontal areas for the
spatial relations (see also [12,13] for an overview on imaging
studies on spatial semantics).
The third area, where localizationsof greaterprecision havebeen
made, concerns action words that involve specific body parts (such
as kick,o rpunch), where the relevant parts of motor and pre-motor
cortex may be activated in a somatotopic manner [14,15]: thus kick
activates a part of the motor strip close to the vertex, an area
associated withthe leg,butpunchadorso-lateralpart,associated with
the arm. These data suggest that the meaning of words cannot
reside in a single cortical locus, as used to be thought on the basis of
lesion data, but rather invoke distributed circuitry activating areas
specially connected to their referents. Of course these action words,
in their reference to concrete body-parts, are prime candidates for
any such ‘‘embodied’’ representation of meaning. ‘‘It remains to be
determined’’, says Pulvermu ¨ller [15], ‘‘whether it might be possible
to read aspects of meaning of other words, such as abstract terms,
from the cortex in a similar manner’’.
The study reported here picks up this challenge. We show here
that it is possible to pinpoint the contribution of specific patterns of
neural activation to an abstract aspect of meaning, namely the
specific frame of reference or spatial coordinate system associated
with the description of a spatial scene.
In language three major types of reference systems can be
distinguished [16]: intrinsic (object-oriented), relative (egocentric)
and absolute (world-oriented). Most European languages predom-
inantly use a relative frame of reference with terms like ‘front’,
‘back’, ‘left’ and ‘right’ to form descriptions such as: ‘‘The ball is in
front of the man (from my point of view)’’. But the same languages
can also use an intrinsic frame of reference, a coordinate system
making use of the named facts of a reference object as in ‘‘at the
back of the house’’. Some other languages around the world
predominantly use a third system, a so-called absolute frame of
reference, in which linguistic descriptions use cardinal-direction
type systems comparable to our North-South-East-West. [17–19].
The preferred frame of reference within a language may influence
the way an environment is cognitively represented [16,20]. Here
we use the term ‘intrinsic’ for an object-centered reference frame
and the term ‘relative’ for a viewer-centered frame [16].
Figure 1. Sentence-picture matching task and conditions. (A) Participants saw a sentence for 1500 ms and afterwards a scene for 2000 ms.
Immediately thereafter a fixation cross with a variable time interval from 1000–3000 ms followed during which participants responded. Afterwards
feedback was displayed for 500 ms. (B) Stimuli from all conditions were presented randomly intermixed within the two blocks of relative and intrinsic
feedback.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030657.g001
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investigate differential neural correlates for relative and intrinsic
frames of reference (see Figure 1). Participants read a sentence
describing a spatial scene, followed by viewing a picture, and
decided whether the sentence matched the picture or not. During
a block of trials, consistent feedback (correct, incorrect) was given
so inducing either a relative or intrinsic frame. Midway through
the trials, the second block began and the feedback was switched to
the alternative reference frame without further explanation (see
Methods and Materials section below).
Results
Behavioral data
The mean number of errors during the intrinsic and relative block
was not significantly different (total intrinsic frame of reference:
11.68; total relative frame of reference: 12.71). Also, no difference in
the mean number of errors was found between the specific pictures
under each interpretative frame, i.e. between the condition pairs
intrinsic C1 and relative C1 (2.18 and 2.39) (see Figure 1B for
examples), intrinsic C2 and relative C2 (1.25 and 1.07), intrinsic C3
and relative C4 (4.21 and 4.39), intrinsic C4 and relative C3 (2.75
and 3.68), intrinsic C5 and relative C5 (1.11 and 0.89), and intrinsic
C6 and relative C6 (0.18 and 0.29). However, the mean amount of
errors during the first block was significantly lower than during the
second block (8.75 and 15.64; t(27)=23.63, p,0.001) – not
unexpected, since the conditions changed without warning. No
significantly different mean number of errors was found between the
2
nd block in the intrinsic frame of reference mode and the 2
nd block
in the relative frame of reference mode (12.86 and 18.43).
The mean response times for the two frames of reference
showed a trend towards significance (t(27)=21.87, p=0.07):
Response times were marginally faster for the relative frame of
reference (854 ms) than for the intrinsic frame of reference
(886 ms). The mean response times for the first block and the
second block showed no difference (respectively 868 ms and
873 ms). Also, no differences in mean response times were found
between the pictures under distinct frames, i.e. intrinsic C2 and
relative C2 (1010 ms and 1000 ms; see Figure 1B), intrinsic C5
and relative C5 (801 ms and 795 ms), and intrinsic C6 and relative
C6 (649 ms and 663 ms). Mean response-time differences were
found between the condition pairs intrinsic C1 and relative C1
(946 ms and 885 ms; t(27)=2.46, p,0.05), and intrinsic C3 and
relative C4 (1009 ms and 948 ms; t(27)=2.08, p,0.05). The mean
response times of conditions intrinsic C4 and relative C3 showed a
trend towards faster relative responses (903 ms and 834 ms;
t(27)=1.85, p=0.08).
FMRI data
Compared to the low level baseline (scrambled pictures, C6 in
Figure 1B), relative, and intrinsic trials strongly activated bilateral
occipitotemporal cortices. This region is usually referred to as the
ventral visual pathway [21].
Neural correlates of intrinsic and relative frames of
reference
First of all we analyzed the sentence part of the trials. All
sentences given in the intrinsic block as compared to all sentences
given in the relative block revealed increased activity in the right
posterior cingulate gyrus, the fusiform gyrus, the superior frontal
gyrus (Figure 2A, Table 1), as well as in the left inferior occipital
gyrus, in the putamen, the supramarginal gyrus, and the
parahippocampal gyrus (Figure 2B, Table 1). Relative sentences
as compared to intrinsic sentences showed no increased activity at
Figure 2. Brain areas showing increased responses for intrinsic sentences versus relative sentences. (A) Increased activity in the right
posterior cingulate and the superior frontal gyrus. (B) Increased activity in the left occipital gyrus and the putamen.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030657.g002
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sentences as compared to intrinsic sentences showed an increase in
activity in the left superior frontal gyrus (x=28, y=68, z=13, BA
10) at a higher threshold only (p,0.003).
Secondly we analyzed the picture part of the trials. Intrinsic
pictures (C1–C4) as compared to high level baseline trials (C5)
revealed increased activity in the temporal and occipital gyrus
(Table 2). Relative pictures (C1–C4) as compared to high level
baseline trials (C5) revealed a widespread network of activity.
Increased activity was observed in the left parietal lobe, in bilateral
frontal areas, and in the precentral gyrus (Table 3).
We focused on the direct comparison between relative and
intrinsic pictures. The direct comparison of all experimental
conditions (C1–C4) from the intrinsic block with the same
conditions (C1–C4) from the relative block revealed increased
activity in the right parahippocampal gyrus for the intrinsic
conditions (x=25, y=0, z=226, 239 mm
3 BA 38 , Peak t value
4.48, see Figure 3A). Besides the parahippocampal activity, an
increase in activity was detected in the right superior occipital
gyrus (x=25, y=269, z=14, 40 mm
3,B A1 9 ,P e a ktv a l u e
4.44).
The same conditions when comparing relative with intrinsic
pictures revealed increased activity in the right superior frontal
gyrus (x=10, y=20, z=52, 72 mm
3, BA 6, Peak t value 4.98,
Figure 3B).
When comparing only the C1 and C2 conditions from the
intrinsic with the relative block – conditions in which the correct
responses were identical for both the relative as well as the intrinsic
frame of reference – strongly increased activity was found for the
intrinsic conditions in the left temporal pole (x=241, y=7,
z=226, 271 mm
3, BA 38, Peak t value 4.11 ) as well as in the
right temporal pole (x=24y=4, z=232, 57 mm
3, BA 38, Peak t
value 3.5 ) and in the bilateral parahippocampal gyrus (left:
x=233, y=0, z=230, 46 mm
3, BA 36, Peak t value 4.0; right:
x=26, y=21, z=26, BA 36, 138 mm
3, Peak t value 4.12 ). The
relative as compared to the intrinsic C1 and C2 conditions
revealed increased activity for the relative trials in the superior
frontal gyrus (x=15, y=213, z=67, BA 6) at a higher threshold
only (p,0.003, 38 mm
3). No activity was observed at the lower
threshold (p,0.001).
Discussion
In the present event-related fMRI study we investigated the
cortical systems underlying the concepts of spatial frames of
reference that are crucially involved in spatial language. Using
ambiguous sentences that could be interpreted in either frame, and
inducing one or the other frame in a verification task, we have
been able to pinpoint distinct neural correlates for an abstract
semantic parameter in language, namely the frame of reference
associated with the interpretation of an ambiguous spatial scene.
In the following we discuss our results in detail.
Participants performed a sentence picture-matching task and
received feedback supporting either an intrinsic or a relative frame
Table 1. Increased brain activity for intrinsic sentences vs. relative sentences.
Talairach coordinates
Anatomical region xyz BA Size (mm
3) Peak T value
Right
Posterior cingulate gyrus 1 268 13 30 990 6.76
Posterior cingulate gyrus 12 261 8 30 1715 6.77
Posterior cingulate gyrus 12 247 22 31 69 5.75
Fusiform gyrus 27 258 212 37 233 5.0
Putamen 18 16 6 17 4.8
Superior frontal gyrus 16 17 39 8 281 5.57
Left
Inferior occipital gyurs 243 276 7 19 1057 5.70
Putamen 228 214 4 171 5.6
Supramarginal gyrus 250 222 19 40 84 5.2
Parahippocampal gyrus 215 233 253 0 2 0 5 . 1
P,0.0001 (FDR,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030657.t001
Table 2. Increased brain activity for intrinsic conditions C1–C4 vs. intrinsic baseline C5.
Talairach coordinates
Anatomical region xyz BA Size (mm
3) Peak T value
Left
parahippocampal gyrus 232 231 215 36 64 4.55
middle occipital gyrus 228 283 8 18 237 4.88
P,0.001 (cluster-size corrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030657.t002
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in. Each trial consisted of a sentence and a picture, which were
analyzed in separate contrasts. Comparing all intrinsic sentences
with the same number of identical sentences given in the relative
feedback block revealed a widespread network of increased
occipital, frontal, and temporal regions for the intrinsic sentences
(Table 1, Figure 2). No increased activity was observed for the
relative sentences. Firstly, this result shows that the differentiation
of intrinsic and relative reference frames starts early already at the
level of sentence processing. Secondly, the increased neural
network for sentences in the intrinsic feedback block might reflect
the larger effort that participants need to interpret the sentences
intrinsically. This could be due to the native language of the
participants (Dutch) which is a language that dominantly makes
use of the relative reference frame [16,22]. This is further
supported by findings showing the posterior cingulate cortex
involved in task engagement and change detection [23], and the
supramarginal gyrus involved in language processing more
generally [24] (Table 1). Thirdly and interestingly, intrinsic
sentences already engage the parahippocampal gyrus, a brain
region also involved when processing the intrinsic pictures. This
shows that the sentences are already fully processed intrinsically
and might enable the participants to simply map the picture
following the sentence on the intrinsic representation.
Table 3. Increased brain activity for relative conditions C1–C4 vs. relative baseline C5.
Talairach coordinates
Anatomical region xyz BA Size (mm
3) Peak T value
Right
Superior frontal gyrus 9 65 9 10 75 4.84
Left
Superior parietal lobule 230 250 30 7 40 4.53
Medial aspect of frontal lobe 26 4 51 6 180 4.68
Precentral gyrus 245 21 47 6 382 4.55
Superior frontal gyrus 214 21 62 6 335 4.79
P,0.001 (cluster-size corrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030657.t003
Figure 3. Brain areas showing increased responses for intrinsic and relative pictures. (A) Increased activity in the right parahippocampal
gyrus for intrinsic pictures compared to relative pictures. (B) Increased activity in the right superior frontal gyrus for relative pictures compared to
intrinsic pictures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030657.g003
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experimental conditions showed increased activity in the right
parahippocampal gyrus and the superior occipital gyrus
(Figure 3A). Relative trials as compared to intrinsic trials on the
other hand revealed increased neural activity in the frontal lobe
(Figure 3B). Further evidence for these different neural correlates
for both frames of reference comes from contrasting the C1 and
C2 conditions only. In these conditions both frames of references
are always correct or incorrect in both feedback blocks. The results
show bilateral parahippocampal activity for intrinsic pictures and
the superior frontal gyrus for relative pictures.
The behavioral results showed no difference in error rates
between intrinsic and relative frames of reference. Therefore the
fMRI results that include correct responses only were not biased
by differences in errors between both frames of reference. In the
second block participants made significantly more errors than in
the first block due to shifting to the alternative frame of reference.
The response times showed that relative responses are marginally
faster than intrinsic responses. This trend most likely reflects the
dominance of the relative reference frame in most speakers of
Dutch, the language of the participants [16,22]. The response
times are modeled as parametric modulation regressors in the
fMRI analyses, which rules out that the differences in neural
correlates are due to or influenced by the marginally faster
responses in the relative block.
Coding space within different frames of reference can require
different cognitive processes [25–27]. FMRI data have suggested
that different frames of reference can be linked to differential
patterns of neural activation [28–30]. It has been proposed that
the hippocampus is involved in the creation of absolute
representations [31,32], while parietal lobes have been argued to
subserve especially relative spatial computations [33]. Recent
results show shared activity in occipital, superior parietal, superior
frontal and left inferior temporal brain regions in both frames [34].
Comparing trials with intrinsic as well as relative pictures to
baseline trials (Table 2 and 3) we found a shared widespread
network with increased activity in occipital, parietal, temporal and
frontal brain regions. This is in line with evidence from an fMRI
study that distinguished viewer-, object-, and landmark-centered
distance judgments, and found common activity for all three types
in bilateral parietal, occipital, and right frontal premotor regions as
well [29]. These results provide evidence for a widespread network
activated when any of the different frames of references are used to
make a decision.
The present study used a sentence-picture matching task within
two unmarked blocks, with the relative or intrinsic frame cued only
by feedback about correct/incorrect matches. The task instruc-
tions required participants simply to decide whether a sentence
matched the following picture and remained identical for both
blocks with intrinsic and relative feedback. This allowed us to use
exactly the same stimulus material under two variants to indirectly
induce interpretations, without explicit instruction about reference
frames. Therefore the distinct neural networks observed for the
relative and the intrinsic frame of reference were not influenced by
differences in stimuli or by different interpretations of complex task
instructions. This method offers a distinct advantage over previous
studies that were unable to use identical stimuli to investigate the
different reference frames and needed to inform participants
directly about the explicit reference frame that should be used to
solve a task [29,34]. Identical stimuli for both frames of reference
allowed us to analyze the neural correlates of a change solely in the
subjective meaning or interpretation of the sentences. This is
especially true for the conditions C1 and C2 (Figure 1B), stimuli
that are ambiguous between the intrinsic and the relative frame of
reference, allowing both interpretations as correct or incorrect
solutions. We were able to observe distinct neural correlates for
each frame - the intrinsic reference frame in the temporal lobe and
for the relative reference frame in the frontal lobe - when directly
contrasting these trials from both feedback blocks.
Numerous recent neuroimaging studies have revealed brain areas
involved in spatial processing. Special foci have been the temporal
and the parietal lobe [35]. There is much evidence from animal as
well as human studies for the involvement of the mediotemporal
lobe, including the hippocampal formation and the parahippocam-
pal region, in navigation and the representation of space [36,37]. In
the rat hippocampus specific neurons called place cells encode the
animal’s location [31]. This was taken as support for the existence of
an allocentric representation of space or cognitive map, using world-
centered coordinates in the hippocampus. Recently place cells were
found in the human hippocampus while participants navigated
through a virtual maze [32].
In the present study we directly compared intrinsic with relative
trials and observed increased activity for intrinsic trials in bilateral
parahippocampal gyrus (Figure 3), an area closely connected to the
hippocampus through the entorhinal and perirhinal gyrus. Recent
neuroimaging studies emphasize the importance of the parahippo-
campal gyrus for the recognition of familiar as well as novel spatial
environments and scenes [38–43] and for object-location memory
[36,44,45]. To correctly solve intrinsic trials participants needed to
consider the spatial relation of two objects and decide whether the
scene matched a previously presented sentence. Therefore scene
representation within the parahippocampal gyrus should be able to
support intrinsic frames of reference.
Whereas the right medial temporal area is associated with
memory for object locations in an allocentric frame of reference,
fMRI data has shown that the parietal lobe is associated with
representations of object locations in an egocentric reference frame
[33–35,46]. The present data when comparing relative trials to
baseline trials supports the involvement of the parietal lobe. We
observed increased activity in the left parietal lobe for the relative
frame of reference only, confirming neurophysiological studies
which report the involvement of the parietal lobe in egocentric
coding [33].
Relative trials as compared to intrinsic trials also showed
strongly increased activity in superior frontal gyrus (Figure 3B).
This is in line with findings from researchers [29] who have
observed a parietal/frontal network for viewer-centered coding.
In essence, in the present fMRI study we used a sentence-picture
matching task and gave feedback in two separate blocks supporting
either a relative or an intrinsic frame of reference. With this method
we were able to pinpoint the patterns of neural activity associated
with each frame of reference, by using the exact same perceptual
stimuli. Intrinsic conditions as compared to relative conditions
showed increased activity in the parahippocampal gyrus whereas
relative trails compared to intrinsic trials revealed increased neural
activity in the frontallobe. The presentresultsshow differentialneural
networks for both frames of reference that are (in most languages)
crucial to spatial language. Very few earlier studies have been able to
precisely identify a distinctive pattern of neural activity for a specific
but abstract semantic parameter in language. Earlier studies have
focused, for example, on spatial prepositions as a class [9,10]. Just a
few have gone further and explored the neural signatures of specific
dimensions of meaning, for example the temporal vs. spatial
meanings of prepositions [47] or the manner/path distinction in
motion coding [48]. Here we have been able to identify the specific
neural activation patterns involved in the two different senses of
spatial relators like ‘in front of’ – either involving an object centered
(intrinsic) or an egocentric (relative) frame of reference.
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spatial cognition in the activation patterns we have observed. This
was not directly addressed in the current experiment, which did
not contrast linguistic vs. non-linguistic conditions. However,
separate analyses of the brain response to the verbal part of the
stimulus and the (following) pictorial part of the stimulus showed
early differentiation of the two frames of reference in both
modalities, with some striking similarities of activation within the
frame of reference across both modalities. This frame-of-reference
specialization in both linguistic and visual interpretation is perhaps
not surprising since the use of language has to be supported by the
requisite underlying perceptual and conceptual activations.
Nevertheless, there is converging evidence from neuropsychology
[49] and imaging studies [50,11] that spatial language requires a
categorical rather than the metric or coordinate spatial conception
involved in action and perception, even though both systems must
somehow talk to one another.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight healthy human adults (16 women, 12 men) gave
informed written consent before participating in the experiment.
Twenty-six participants were included in the fMRI analyses. All
participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. The age ranged from 20–34 (average 24.3,
Std=3.1). The study was approved by the CMO Committee on
Research Involving Human Subjects (Region Arnhem-Nijmegen).
Materials and Procedure
Participants saw a sentence describing a spatial scene from a
first-person perspective and had to decide if the following picture
and the sentence matched. The timing details of the task are
provided in Figure 1. Each picture always contained a ball and an
object or a person or an animal, such as old or young women and
men, different animals, different types of vehicles (e.g. jeep,
bulldozer) and objects with a clear front and back such as a chair,
piano, and cabinet (32 different objects in total). Since the ball has
no intrinsic front it served as an ideal referent object in all trials.
Participants were instructed to decide as accurately and as quickly
as possible if the sentence and the picture match. No further
instruction and information about different reference frames was
given. They responded with their right hand by pressing a key with
the index finger for a correct decision and a second key with the
middle finger for an incorrect judgment. They received feedback
after each trial that indicated that the answer was correct,
incorrect or given too late.
Four experimental conditions C1–C4 were included twice in
two separate blocks; relative and intrinsic. Two baseline tasks were
included (see Figure 1), a high level baseline (C5) and a low level
baseline (C6). In total 320 trials were shown randomly intermixed
within each block. Midway through the trials the second block
started and the feedback switched to the alternate reference frame.
Half of the participants started with the relative block and switched
to the intrinsic feedback block whereas the other half received the
blocks in the reversed order. Participants were not informed about
the switch in feedback. The C1 and C2 conditions included 16
trials each. The C3–C6 conditions included 32 trails each. The C1
and C2 conditions included less trials then the other conditions
since the correct and incorrect answers of these trials were
identical for both the relative and the intrinsic block. The feedback
is meaningless in these trials for learning the switch in reference
frames, and therefore the lower number of trials in the conditions
allowed a faster learning of the switch from one reference frame
block to the other.
fMRI procedure
A 3 Tesla MRI system (Siemens TRIO, Erlangen, Germany)
was used to acquire functional images of the whole brain. Using a
gradient-echo-planar scanning (EPI) sequence 36 axial slices per
functional volume were obtained for each participant (voxel-size
36363 mm, TR=2270 ms, field of view=192, TE=30 ms, flip
angle=75). All functional images were acquired in one run that
lasted for 50 minutes. Following the acquisition of functional
images a high-resolution anatomical scan (T1-weighted MP-
RAGE, 176 slices) was acquired.
fMRI data analysis
FMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using BrainVoya-
ger QX (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). The
first five volumes of the EPI data per participant were discarded to
allow for T1 equilibration. Functional images were corrected for
motion and slice scan time acquisition. Data were temporally
smoothed with a high pass filter removing frequencies below 3
cycles per time course. Functional images were coregistered with
the anatomical scan and transformed into Talairach coordinate
space using the 9-parameter landmark method of Talairach and
Tournoux [51]. Images were spatially smoothed with a FWHM
Gaussian kernel of 6 mm.
Statistical analyses were performed in the context of the general
linear model. We included 14 regressors of interests based on the
experimental conditions. These conditions included two regressors
for the sentences, one modeling all intrinsic sentences and one
modeling all relative sentences, and 12 regressors for the picture
trials (see Figure 1). Additionally two regressors of no interest for
the error trials were included modeling intrinsic and relative error
trials separately. Participants response times were included as
parametric modulation regressors to take into account the
marginal faster responses for relative trials. This rules out response
times as a nuisance covariate and excludes that any difference in
responses times possibly resulting from differences in attentional
demands provides the basis for the results. For the analysis of the
sentence part all trials were included, for analyses of the picture
part only correct responses were included in the reported analyses.
Event-related hemodynamic responses for each of the different
event-types were modeled as delta functions convolved with a
synthetic hemodynamic response function lasting 1500 ms for the
sentences and 2000 ms for the picture trials. Random-effects
whole brain group analyses were performed. Specific effects were
tested by applying linear contrasts to the parameter estimates for
each event as obtained in the random effects group analyses. The
statistical threshold for the group analyses was set at P,0.05, false
discovery rate (FDR) corrected for multiple comparisons [52], and
at an exploratory lower threshold at p,0.001 at the voxel level
with a minimum cluster size of 40 mm
3, uncorrected for multiple
comparisons [53].
Acknowledgments
We thank Clemens Jansen, and Joost Wegman for help during data
acquisition and data analyses, and Dr. Alexander Kranjec for helpful
comments on the manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: GJ DBMH SCL. Performed the
experiments: GJ. Analyzed the data: GJ. Wrote the paper: GJ DBMH
SCL.
Neural Correlates of Spatial Frame of Reference
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30657References
1. Schoth F, Waberski TD, Krings T, Gobbele R, Buchner H (2007) Cerebral
processing of spontaneous reversals of the rotating Necker cube. Neuroreport 18:
1335–1338.
2. Pitts MA, Martı ´nez A, Stalmaster C, Nerger JL, Hillyard SA (2009) Neural
generators of ERPs linked with Necker cube reversals. Psychophysiology 46:
1–9.
3. Lumer ED, Rees G (1999) Covariation of activity in visual and prefrontal cortex
associated with subjective visual perception. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 96:
1669–1673.
4. Mason RA, Just MA (2007) Lexical ambiguity in sentence comprehension. Brain
Res 1146: 115–127.
5. Uchiyama Y, Toyoda H, Honda M, Yoshida H, Kochiyama T, et al. (2008)
Functional segregation of the inferior frontal gyrus for syntactic processes: A
functional magnetic-resonance imaging study. Neurosci Res 61: 309–318.
6. Hagoort P, Brown C (2000) ERP effects of listening to speech compared to
reading: the P600/SPS to syntactic violations in spoken sentences and rapid
serial visual presentation. Neuropsychol 38: 1531–1549.
7. Warrington EK, Shallice T (1984) Category specific semantic impairments.
Brain 107: 829–853.
8. Bookheimer S (2002) Functional MRI of language: New approaches to
understanding the cortical organization of semantic processing. Annu Rev
Neurosci 25: 151–188.
9. Amorapanth P, Widick P, Chatterjee A (2009) The Neural Basis for Spatial
Relations. J Cogn Neurosci 22: 1739–1753.
10. Damasio H, Grabowski TJ, Tranel D, Ponto LL, Hichwa RD, et al. (2001)
Neural correlates of naming actions and of naming spatial relations. Neuro-
Image 13: 1053–1064.
11. Noordzij ML, Neggers SFW, Ramsey NF, Postma A (2008) Neural correlates of
locative prepositions. Neuropsychologia 46: 1576–1580.
12. Chatterjee A (2008) The Neural Organization of Spatial Thought and
Language. Seminars in Speech and Language 29: 226–238.
13. Kranjec A, Chatterjee A (2010) Are temporal concepts embodied? A challenge
for cognitive neuroscience. Frontiers in Psychol 1: 240.
14. Pulvermu ¨ller F (2001) Brain reflections of words and their meaning. Trends
Cogn Sci 5: 517–524.
15. Pulvermu ¨ller F (2005) Brain mechanisms linking language and action. Nat Rev
Neurosci 6: 576–582.
16. Levinson SC (2003) Space in language and cognition: Explorations in cognitive
diversity. Cambridge: CUP.
17. Majid A, Bowerman M, Kita S, Haun DBM, Levinson SC (2004) Can language
restructure cognition? The case for space. Trends Cogn Sci 8: 108–114.
18. Haun DBM, Rapold C, Call J, Janzen G, Levinson SC (2006) Cognitive
cladistics and cultural override in Hominid spatial cognition. ProcNatl Acad Sci
USA 103: 17568–17573.
19. Haun DB, Rapold CJ (2009) Variation in memory for body movements across
cultures. Curr Biol 19: R1068–1069.
20. Levinson SC, Kita S, Haun DBM, Rasch BH (2002) Returning the tables:
language affects spatial reasoning. Cognition 84: 155–188.
21. Ungerleider LG, Mishkin M (1982) Two cortical visual systems. In: Ingle DJ,
Goodale MA, Mansfield RJW, eds. Analysis of Visual Behavior. Cambridge:
MIT-Press. pp 549–586.
22. Levelt WJM (1989) Speaking: From intention to articulation. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press. 154 p.
23. Pearson JM, Heilbronner SR, Barack DL, Hayden BY, Platt ML (2011)
Posterior cingulate cortex: adapting behavior to a changing world. Trends Cogn
Sciences 15: 143–151.
24. Mayeux R, Kandel ER (1985) Natural language, disorders of language, and
other localizable disorders of cognitive function. In: Principles of neural science
Kandel ER, Schwartz J, eds. 688–703, New York: Elsevier.
25. Wallentin M, Roepstorff A, Burgess N (2008) Frontal eye fields involved in
shifting frames of reference within working memory for scenes. Neuropsychol
46: 399–408.
26. Neggers SFW, Scho ¨lvinck ML, van der Lubbe RHJ, Postma A (2005)
Quantifing the interactions between allo- and egocentric representation of
space. Acta Psychol 118: 25–45.
27. Hartley T, Trinkler I, Burgess N (2004) Geometric Determinants of Human
Spatial Memory. Cognition 94: 39–75.
28. Burgess N, Maguire EA, O’Keefe J (2002) The human hippocampus and spatial
and episodic memory. Neuron 35: 625–641.
29. Committeri G, Galati G, Paradis A-L, Pizzamiglio L, Berthoz A, et al. (2004)
Reference frames for spatial cognition: Different Brain areas are involved in
viewer-, object-, and landmark centered judgements about object location. J Cog
Neurosci 16: 1517–1535.
30. Jordan K, Schadow J, Wuestenberg T, Heinze H-J, Ja ¨ncke L (2004) Different
cortical activations for subjects using allocentric or egocentric strategies in a
virtual navigation task. Neuroreport 15: 135–140.
31. O’Keefe J, Nadel L (1978) The hippocampus as a cognitive map. Clarendon:
Oxford.
32. Ekstrom AD, Kahana MJ, Caplan JB, Fields TA, Isham EA, et al. (2003)
Cellular networks underlying human spatial navigation. Nature 425: 184–187.
33. Cohen YE, Andersen RA (2002) A common reference frame for movement
plans in the posterior parietal cortex. Nat Rev Neurosci 3: 553–62.
34. Zaehle T, Jordan K, Wu ¨stenberg T, Baudewig J, Dechent P, et al. (2007) The
neural basis of the egocentric and allocentric spatial frame of reference. Brain
Res 1137: 92–103.
35. Burgess N, Jeffery KJ, O’Keefe J (1999) The hippocampal and parietal
foundations of spatial cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
36. Janzen G, van Turennout M (2004) Selective neural representation of objects
relevant for navigation. Nat Neurosci 7: 673–677.
37. Maguire EA, Burgess N, Donnett JG, Frackowiak RSJ, Frith CD, et al. (1998)
Knowing where and getting there: A human navigation network. Science 280:
921–924.
38. Aguirre GK, Detre JA, Alsop DC, D’Esposito M (1996) The parahippocampus
subserves topographical learning in man. Cereb Cortex 6: 823–829.
39. Maguire EA, Frith CD, Burgess N, Donnett JG, O’Keefe J (1998) Knowing
where things are: Parahippocampal involvement in encoding object locations in
virtual large scale space. J Cog Neurosci 10: 61–76.
40. Epstein R, Harris A, Stanley D, Kanwisher N (1999) The parahippocampal
place area: Recognition, navigation, or encoding? Neuron 23: 115–125.
41. Epstein R, Kanwisher N (1998) Cortical representation of the local visual
environment. Nature 392: 598–601.
42. Epstein R, Graham KS, Dowing PE (2003) Viewpoint-specific scene
representations in human parahippocampal cortex. Neuron 37: 865–876.
43. Rosenbaum RS, Ziegler M, Winocur G, Grady CL, Moscovitch M (2004) ‘‘I
have often walked down this street before’’: fMRI studies on the hippocampus
and other structures during mental navigation of an old environment.
Hippocampus 14: 826–835.
44. Janzen G, Wagensveld B, van Turennout M (2007) Neural representation of
navigational relevance is rapidly induced an long-lasting. Cereb Cortex 17:
975–981.
45. Janzen G, Jansen C (2010) A neural wayfinding mechanism adjusts for
ambiguous landmark information. NeuroImage 52: 364–370.
46. Vallar G, Lobel E, Galati G, Berthoz A, Pizzamiglio L, et al. (1999) A fronto-
parietal system for computing the egocentric spatial frame of reference in
humans. Exp Brain Res 124: 281–6.
47. Kemmerer D (2005) The spatial and temporal meanings of English prepositions
can be independently impaired. Neuropsychol 43: 797–806.
48. Wu D, Morganti A, Chatterjee A (2008) Neural substrates of processing path
and manner information of a moving event. Neuropsychologia 46: 704–713.
49. Kemmerer D, Tranel D (2000) A double dissociation between linguistic and
perceptual representations of spatial relationships. Cogn Neuropsychol 17:
393–414.
50. Kosslyn S, Thompson W, Gitelman D, Alpert N (1998) Neural systems that
encode categorical versus coordinate spatial relations: PET investigations.
Psychobiol 26: 333–347.
51. Talairach J, Tournoux P (1988) A Co-Planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human
Brain Thieme Medical Publishers: New York.
52. Genovese CR, Lazar NA, Nichols T (2002) Thresholding of statistical maps in
functional neuroimaging using the false discovery rate. NeuroImage 15:
870–878.
53. Forman SD, Cohen JD, Fitzgerald M, Eddy WF, Mintun MA, et al. (1995)
Improved assessment of significant activation in functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI): Use of a cluster-size threshold. Magn Reson Med 33: 636–47.
Neural Correlates of Spatial Frame of Reference
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30657